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1 Introduction
In the last decades, there is an increased interest in studying diverse problems in economics and
optimal control theory using dynamic games. In particular in environmental economics and macro-
economic policy coordination, dynamic games are a natural framework to model policy coordination
problems (see e.g. the books and references in Dockner et al. [4] and Engwerda [10]). In these
problems, the open-loop Nash strategy is often used as one of the benchmarks to evaluate outcomes
of the game. In optimal control theory it is well-known that, e.g., the issue to obtain robust control
strategies can be approached as a dynamic game problem (see e.g. [2]).
In this note we consider the open-loop linear quadratic diﬀerential game. This problem has been
considered by many authors and dates back to the seminal work of Starr and Ho in [16] (see, e.g.,
[14], [15], [5], [12], [11], [1], [17], [6], [7], [3] and [13]). More speciﬁcally, we study in this paper
the (regular indeﬁnite) inﬁnite-planning horizon case. The corresponding regular deﬁnite (that is
the case that the state weighting matrices Qi (see below) are semi-positive deﬁnite) problem has
been studied, e.g., extensively in [6] and [7]. Whereas [13] studied the regular indeﬁnite case using
a functional analysis approach, under the assumption that the uncontrolled system is stable. In
particular, these papers show that, in general, the inﬁnite-planning horizon problem does not have
a unique equilibrium. Moreover [13] shows that whenever the game has more than one equilibrium,
there will exist an inﬁnite number of equilibria. Furthermore the existence of a unique solution is
related to the existence of a so-called strongly stabilizing solution of the set of coupled algebraic
Riccati equations, see (4) below.
1In [9] these results were generalized for stabilizable systems using a state-space approach, for
a performance criterion that is a pure quadratic form of the state and control variables. In this
note we generalize this result for performance criteria that also include ”cross-terms”, i.e. products
of the state and control variables. Performance criteria of this type often naturally appear in
economic policy making and have been studied, e.g., in [8] and [13]. In this paper we, moreover,
assume that the linear system describing the dynamics is aﬀected by a deterministic variable. For a
ﬁnite-planning horizon the corresponding open-loop linear quadratic game has been studied in [3].
The outline of this note is as follows. Section two introduces the problem and contains some
preliminary results. The main results of this paper are stated in Section three, whereas Section four
contains some concluding remarks. The proofs of the main theorems are included in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries



























 and Rii > 0,i =1 ,2,
and x(t) is the solution from the linear diﬀerential equation
˙ x(t)=Ax(t)+B1u1(t)+B2u2(t)+c(t),x (0) = x0. (2)
The variable c(.) here is some given vector, which growth over time is restricted by some constant
(that will be speciﬁed later on). Notice that we do not make any deﬁniteness assumptions w.r.t.
matrix Qi.
We assume that the matrix pairs (A,Bi),i =1 ,2, are stabilizable. So, in principle, each player
is capable to stabilize the system on his own.
The open-loop information structure of the game means that we assume that both players only
know the initial state of the system and that the set of admissible control actions are functions of
time, where time runs from zero to inﬁnity. We assume that the players choose control functions
belonging to the set
Us =
 




where L2,loc is the set of locally square-integrable functions, i.e.,





For notational convenience we introduce next some shorthand notation. The next notation will be























2where it will be assumed throughout that this matrix G is invertible,















































 =[ Vi,W i],i =1 ,2;
˜ A := A − BG
−1Z; ˜ Si := BG
−1 ˜ B
T














  ˜ A −˜ S
− ˜ Q − ˜ AT
2
 
, where ˜ S :=[ ˜ S1, ˜ S2], ˜ Q :=


























In the rest of the paper the algebraic Riccati equations
A




i Ki + V
T
i )+Qi =0 ,i =1 ,2. (3)
and the set of (coupled) algebraic Riccati equations
0= ˜ A
T
2P + P ˜ A − PBG
−1 ˜ B












play a crucial role.
Deﬁnition 2.1 As o l u t i o nP T =:( P T
1 ,PT
2 ), with Pi ∈ I Rn, of the set of algebraic Riccati equations
(4) is called
a. stabilizing,i fσ( ˜ A − BG−1 ˜ BTP) ⊂ l C−; 1
b. strongly stabilizing if
i. it is a stabilizing solution, and
ii. σ(− ˜ AT
2 + PBG −1 ˜ BT) ⊂ l C
+
0 ;
The next relationship between certain invariant subspaces of matrix M and solutions of the Riccati
equation (4) is well-known (see e.g. Engwerda et al. [8])
1σ(H) denotes the spectrum of matrix H; l C− = {λ ∈ l C | Re(λ) < 0}; l C
+
0 = {λ ∈ l C | Re(λ) ≥ 0}.
3Lemma 2.2 Let V ⊂ I R3n be an n-dimensional invariant subspace of M,a n dl e tXi ∈ I Rn×n,i =












If X0 is invertible, then Pi := XiX
−1
0 ,i =1 ,2, is a solution to the set of coupled Riccati equations
(4) and σ(A − BG−1(Z + ˜ BTP)=σ(M|V). Furthermore, the solution (P1,P 2) is independent of
the speciﬁc choice of basis of V . 
Lemma 2.3
1. The set of algebraic Riccati equations (4) has a strongly stabilizing solution (P1,P 2) if and only
if matrix M has an n-dimensional stable graph subspace and M has 2n eigenvalues (counting
algebraic multiplicities) in l C
+
0 .
2. If the set of algebraic Riccati equations (4) has a strongly stabilizing solution, then it is unique.
Proof.
















  ˜ A − ˜ SP −˜ S
0 − ˜ AT
2 + P ˜ S
 
.
Since P is a strongly stabilizing solution, by Deﬁnition 2.1, matrix M has exact n stable eigenvalues
and 2n eigenvalues (counted with algebraic multiplicities) in l C
+
0 . Furthermore, obviously, the stable
subspace is a graph subspace.
The converse statement is obtained similarly using the result of Lemma 2.2.
2. See, e.g., Kremer [13, Section 3.2]. 
3 Main results
Using the previous results, in the Appendix the following theorem is proved.
Theorem 3.1 If the linear quadratic diﬀerential game (1,2) has an open-loop Nash equilibrium for
every initial state, then
1. M has at least n stable eigenvalues (counted with algebraic multiplicities). More in particular,









for some ˜ Vi ∈ I Rn×n.
42. the two algebraic Riccati equations (3) have a stabilizing solution.
Conversely, if the two algebraic Riccati equations (3) have a stabilizing solution and vT(t)= :
[xT(t),ψT
1 (t),ψT



























provides an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the linear quadratic diﬀerential game (1,2). 
Remark 3.2 Similar conclusions as [9] can be drawn now. A general conclusion is that the number
of equilibria depends critically on the eigenstructure of matrix M.W i t h s denoting the number
(counting algebraic multiplicities) of stable eigenvalues of M we have.
1. If s<n , still for some initial state there may exist an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
2. In case s ≥ 2, the situation might arise that for some initial states there exists an inﬁnite
number of equilibria.
3. In case matrix M has a stable graph subspace, S,o fd i m e n s i o ns>n , for every initial state x0
there exists, generically, an inﬁnite number of open-loop Nash equilibria. 
The next theorem shows that in case the set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (4) have a
stabilizing solution, the game always has at least one equilibrium.
Theorem 3.3 Assume that
1. the set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (4) has a set of stabilizing solutions Pi,i =1 ,2;
and
2. the two algebraic Riccati equations (3) have a stabilizing solution Ki(.), i =1 ,2.
Let α :=m a x σ( ˜ A2 − PBG −1 ˜ BT).
Assume that |c(t)| <β e −αt, for some constant β and for all t>0. Then the linear quadratic
diﬀerential game (1,2) has an open-loop Nash equilibrium for every initial state.








−1(Z + ˜ B
TP)˜ Φ(t,0)x0 − G
−1 ˜ B
Tm(t)), (5)
where ˜ Φ(t,0) is the solution of the transition equation
˙ ˜ Φ(t,0) = (A − BG






(− ˜ A2+PBG−1 ˜ BT)(t−s)Pc(s)ds. 
5Corollary 3.4 An immediate consequence of Lemma 2.2 and Theorem 3.3 is that if M has a stable
invariant graph subspace and the two algebraic Riccati equations (3) have a stabilizing solution, the
game will have at least one open-loop Nash equilibrium. 
Remark 3.5 In case c(.) = 0 it can be shown, similar to [6], that the costs by using the actions
(5) for the players are
x
T
0 ¯ Mix0,i =1 ,2,
where, with Acl := A − BG−1(Z + ˜ BTP), ¯ Mi is the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation
A
T
cl ¯ Mi + ¯ MiAcl +[ I, −G
−1(Z + ˜ B
TP)]Mi[I, −G
−1(Z + ˜ B
TP)]
T =0 . 
Notice that in case the set of algebraic Riccati equations (4) has more than one set of stabilizing
solutions, there exists more than one open-loop Nash equilibrium. Matrix M has then a stable
subspace which dimension is larger than n. Consequently (see Remark 3.2, item 3) for every initial
state there will exist, generically, an inﬁnite number of open-loop Nash equilibria. This point was
ﬁrst noted by Kremer in [13] in case matrix A is stable.
The above reﬂections raise the question whether it is possible to ﬁnd conditions under which the
game has a unique equilibrium for every initial state. The next Theorem 3.6 gives such conditions.
Moreover, it shows that in case there is a unique equilibrium the corresponding actions are obtained
by those described in Theorem 3.3. The proof of this theorem is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 3.6 Consider the linear quadratic diﬀerential game (1,2) with c(.)=0 .
This game has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium for every initial state if and only if
1. The set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (4) has a strongly stabilizing solution, and
2. the two algebraic Riccati equations (3) have a stabilizing solution.
Moreover, in case this game has a unique equilibrium, also the corresponding aﬃne linear quadratic
diﬀerential game, where c(.) satisﬁes the growth constraint formulated in Theorem 3.3, has a unique
equilibrium and the unique equilibrium actions are given by (5). 
4 Concluding Remarks
In this note we considered the aﬃne regular indeﬁnite inﬁnite-planning horizon linear-quadratic
diﬀerential game. Both necessary conditions and suﬃcient conditions were derived for the existence
of an open-loop Nash equilibrium. Moreover, conditions were presented that are both necessary
and suﬃcient for the existence of a unique equilibrium.
The prove our results we basically proceeded along the lines of the proofs of the paper [9].
By adapting those proofs (in a not always trivial manner) we were able to show that the results
obtained in that paper carry over to this extended model.
The above results can be generalized straightforwardly to the N-player case. Furthermore, since
Qi are assumed to be indeﬁnite, the obtained results can be directly used to (re)derive properties
for the zero-sum game, which plays, e.g., an important role in robustness analysis. If players dis-
count their future loss, similar to [6], it follows from Theorem 3.6 that if the discount factor is
”large enough” the game has generically a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium. Finally we conclude
from (23) that the conclusion in [13], that if the game has an open-loop Nash equilibrium for every
initial state either there is a unique equilibrium or an inﬁnite number of equilibria, applies in general.
6Appendix







subject to the state dynamics
˙ x(t)=Ax(t)+Bu(t)+c(t),x (0) = x0, (7)
and u ∈U s(x0).T h e n ,w i t hS := BR−1BT, we have the following result.
Consider the linear quadratic problem (6,7), with c(.)=p(.)=0 . This problem has a solution for
all x0 ∈ I Rn if and only if the algebraic Riccati equation
A
TK + KA− KSK + Q =0 ( 8 )
has a symmetric stabilizing solution K(.) (i.e. A − SK is a stable matrix).
Moreover, if this linear quadratic control problem has a solution, consider the aﬃne linear quadratic
control problem where both c(.) and p(.) satisfy the growth condition:
|c(t)| <β 1e
−αt and |p(t)| <β 2e
−αt












and x∗(t) is the through this optimal control implied solution of the diﬀerential equation
˙ x
∗(t)=( A − SK)x
∗(t) − Sm(t)+c(t),x
∗(0) = x0.
Proof. ”⇐ part” Let K be the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation (8) and m(t)











Note that ˙ n(t)=mT(t)Sm(t) − 2mT(t)c(t)a n d ˙ m(t)=−(A − SK)Tm(t) − (Kc(t)+p(t)) .
Substitution of ˙ n,˙ x and ˙ m into ˙ V , using the fact that ATK + KA = −Q + KSK (see (8)) yields
˙ V (t)=˙ x
T(t)Kx(t)+x













7Since m(t) converges exponentially to zero lim
t→∞n(t) = 0 too. Since lim
t→∞x(t)=0t o o ,
  ∞
0
˙ V (s)ds = −V (0).















Since V (0) does not depend on u(.)a n dR is positive deﬁnite, the advertized result follows.
”⇒ part” This follows, e.g., similar to the proof of Theorem 5.16 of [10]. 
The next Lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Its proof can be found, e.g., in [10].






































1. dim Es ≥ p,a n d






Proof of Theorem 3.1.
”⇒ part” Suppose that u∗
1,u ∗














From the ﬁrst inequality we see that for every x0 ∈ I Rn the (nonhomogeneous) linear quadratic

























subject to the (nonhomogeneous) state equation
˙ x(t)=Ax(t)+B1u1(t)+B2u
∗
2(t)+c(t),x (0) = x0, (11)












































subject to the (nonhomogeneous) state equation








2(t)+c(t),x (0) = x0, (14)















has a stabilizing solution. It is easily veriﬁed that this equation can be rewritten as (3), with i =1 .
In a similar way it follows that also the second algebraic Riccati equation must have a stabilizing
solution. Which completes the proof of point 2.
To prove point 1. we consider Theorem 4.1 in some more detail. According Theorem 4.1 the




















1 ), n1(s)=( B2−B1R
−1
11 N1)u∗
2(s)+c(s)a n dK1 the stabilizing
solution of the algebraic Riccati equation (3), with i = 1. Consequently, see (12),









solves the original optimization problem. Notice that, since the optimal control for this problem is
uniquely determined, and by deﬁnition the equilibrium control u∗







































= A(x(t) − x1(t)).
Since x(0) − x1(0) = x0 − x0 = 0 it follows that x1(t)=x(t).
In a similar way we obtain from the minimization of J2,w i t hu∗
1 n o we n t e r i n gi n t ot h es y s t e ma s

































1(s)+c(s)a n dK2 the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation
(3), with i =2 .
By straightforward diﬀerentiation of mi(t) in (15) and (17), respectively, we obtain





Tm1(t) − (K1B2 − K1B1R
−1












Tm2(t) − (K2B1 − K2B2R
−1






Next, introduce ψi(t):= Kix(t)+mi(t),i =1 ,2. Using (14,15) and (18) we get
˙ ψ1(t)=K1 ˙ x(t)+ ˙ m1(t)














Tm1(t) − (K1B2 − K1B1R
−1
































Similarly it follows that ˙ ψ2(t)=−Q2x(t) − ATψ2(t) − V2u∗
1(t) − W2u∗
2(t).




















2 ψ2(t) − W
T
2 x(t),































, with v1(0) = x0.
Since by assumption, for arbitrary x0, v1(t) converges to zero it is clear from Lemma 4.2 by choosing
consecutively x0 = ei,i=1 ,···,n,that matrix M must have at least n stable eigenvalues (counting
algebraic multiplicities). Moreover, the other statement follows from the second part of this lemma.
Which completes this part of the proof.
”⇐ part” Let u∗














where x(t) satisﬁes the diﬀerential equation




1 ψ1(t) − BG
−1 ˜ B
T
2 ψ2(t),x (0) = x0.
We next show that then necessarily u∗
1 solves the optimization problem (10,11). Since, by as-
sumption, the algebraic Riccati equation (3) has a stabilizing solution, according Theorem 4.1, the
minimization problem (10,11) has a solution. Following the notation of the ”⇒” part of the proof
















Then, similar to (21) we obtain
˙ ˜ ψ1(t)=−Q1x1(t) − A
T ˜ ψ1(t) − V1˜ u1(t) − W1u
∗
2(t).
Consequently, with xd(t):= x(t) − x1(t)a n dψd(t):= ψ1(t) − ˜ ψ1(t)w eh a v e :
˙ xd(t)=˙ x(t) − ˙ x1(t)










































=( A − [B1 0]G







































1 )x1(t)+S1 ˜ ψ1(t)




1 )xd(t) − S1 ˜ ψd(t).
Furthermore, using (20),
˙ ψd(t)= ˙ ψ1(t) − ˙ ˜ ψ1

















T ˜ ψ1 + V1˜ u1(t)+W1u
∗
2(t)





















































































is the Hamiltonian matrix associated
with the algebraic Riccati equation (3). Recall that the spectrum of this matrix is symmetric w.r.t.
the imaginary axis. Since by assumption the Riccati equation (3) has a stabilizing solution, we
know that its stable invariant subspace is given by Span[IK 1]T. Therefore, with Eu representing a












11for some vectors vi,i =1 ,2. However, it is easily veriﬁed that due to our asymptotic stability as-
sumption both xd(t)a n dψd(t) converge to zero if t →∞ .S o ,v2 must be zero. From this it follows
now directly that p = 0. Since the solution of the diﬀerential equation is uniquely determined, and
[xd(t) ψd(t)] = [0 0] solve it, we conclude that x1(t)=x(t)a n d˜ ψ1(t)=ψ1(t). Or stated diﬀerently,
u∗
1 solves the minimization problem.
In a similar way it is shown that for u1 given by u∗
1, player two his optimal control is given by u∗
2.
Which proves the claim. .
Proof of Theorem 3.3.




A − BG−1(Z + ˜ BTP) −BG−1 ˜ BT
0 − ˜ AT









2 +PBG−1 ˜ BT)(t−s)Pc(s)ds,
and x(.) the solution of the diﬀerential equation
˙ x(t)=( A − BG
−1(Z + ˜ B
TP))x(t) − BG
−1 ˜ B
Tm(t)+c(t),x (0) = x0.
Notice that both x(t)a n dψ(t) converges to zero if t →∞ . By direct substitution of this x(t)a n d








,x (0) = x0
it is straightforwardly veriﬁed (using the above decomposition of M)t h a tv(t):=[ xT(t) ψT(t)] is an


















−1((Z + ˜ B
TP)x(t)+ ˜ B
Tm(t)),
provides an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the linear quadratic diﬀerential game (1,2). 
A proof of the next Lemma, that will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.6 can, e.g., also be found
in [10].
Lemma 4.3 Assume there exists an initial state x0  =0such that
x(t)=e
−ATtx0 → 0i ft →∞and B
Tx(t)=0 .
Then (A,B) is not stabilizable. 
12Proof of Theorem 3.6.
”⇒ part” That the Riccati equations (3) must have a stabilizing solution follows directly from
Theorem 3.1.
Assume that matrix M has a s-dimensional stable graph subspace S,w i t hs>n .L e t{b1,···,b s} be
a basis for S.D e n o t edi :=[ I,0,0]bi and assume (without loss of generality) that Span [d1,···,d n]=
I Rn.T h e ndn+1 = µ1d1+···+µndn for some µi,i=1 ,···,n. Furthermore, let x0 = α1d1+···+αndn.
Then also for arbitrary λ ∈ [0,1],
x0 = λ(α1d1 + ···+ αndn)+( 1− λ)(dn+1 − µ1d1 −···−µndn)
=[ I,0,0]{λ(α1b1 + ···+ αnbn)+( 1− λ)(bn+1 − µ1b1 −···−µnbn)}
=[ I,0,0]{(λα1 − (1 − λ)µ1)b1 + ···+( λαn − (1 − λ)µn)bn +( 1− λ)bn+1}.
Next consider
vλ :=( λα1 − (1 − λ)µ1)b1 + ···+( λαn − (1 − λ)µn)bn +( 1− λ)bn+1.
Notice that vλ1  = vλ2 whenever λ1  = λ2.
According Theorem 3.1 all solutions vT(t)=[ xT,ψ T
1 ,ψ T
2 ]o f˙ v(t)=Mv(t),v (0) = vλ, induce then


















Since by assumption for every initial state there is a unique equilibrium strategy it follows on the
one hand that the by these equilibrium strategies induced state trajectory xλ(t) coincides for all λ





i ψi,λ2(t), ∀λ1,λ 2 ∈ [0,1]. (24)
Since ˙ ψ1,λ =( −Q1 − Z1G−1Z)x1,λ(t)+( Z1G−1 ˜ BT
1 − AT)ψ1,λ + Z1G−1 ˜ BT
2 ψ2,λ it follows that
˙ ψi,λ1 − ˙ ψi,λ2 = −A
T(ψi,λ1 − ψi,λ2)a n dB
T
1 (ψi,λ1(t) − ψi,λ2(t)) = 0, for i =1 . (25)
In a similar way it can be shown that the above expression also holds for i =2 .
Notice that both ψi,λ1(t)a n dψi,λ2(t) converge to zero. Furthermore, since vλ1  = vλ2 whenever
λ1  = λ2, {b1,···,b n+1} are linearly independent and Span[d1,···,d n]=I Rn, it can be easily
veriﬁed that at least for one i, ψi,λ1(0)  = ψi,λ2(0), for some λ1 and λ2. Therefore, by Lemma
4.3, it follows from (25) that (A,Bi) is not stabilizable. But this violates our basic assumption.
So, our assumption that s>nmust have been wrong and we conclude that matrix M has an
n-dimensional stable graph subspace and that the dimension of the subspace corresponding with
non-stable eigenvalues is 2n. By Theorem 2.3 the set of Riccati equations (4) has then a strongly
stabilizing solution.
”⇐ part” Since by assumption the stable subspace, Es, is a graph subspace we know that every
initial state, x0, can be written uniquely as a combination of the ﬁrst n entries of the basisvectors
in Es. Consequently, with every x0 there corresponds a unique ψ1 and ψ2 for which the solution of




2 ], converges to zero. So, according
Theorem 3.1, for every x0 there is a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand we have from the
proof of Theorem 3.1 that all Nash equilibrium actions (u∗
1,u ∗















, with x(0) = x0.
13Now, consider with zT :=[ xT ψT
1 ψT
2 ]a n dyT :=[ xT u∗T
1 u∗T
2 ] the system




−[I 0]G−1Z −[I 0]G−1 ˜ BT
1 −[I 0]G−1 ˜ BT
1
−[0 I]G−1Z −[0 I]G−1 ˜ BT

















A − BG−1Z − λI −BG−1 ˜ BT
1 −BG−1 ˜ BT
2
−Q1 + Z1G−1Z −AT + Z1G−1 ˜ BT
1 − λI Z1G−1 ˜ BT
2
−Q2 + Z2G−1ZZ 2G−1 ˜ BT
1 −AT + Z2G−1 ˜ BT
2 − λI
I 00
−G−1Z −G−1 ˜ BT















A − λI 00
−Q1 −AT − λI 0
−Q2 0 −AT − λI
I 00
−G−1Z −G−1 ˜ BT















A − λI 00
−Q1 −AT − λI 0












Since (A,Bi),i=1 ,2, is stabilizable, it is easily veriﬁed from the above expression that the pair
(C,M) is detectable. Consequently, due to our assumption that x(t)a n du∗
i(t),i=1 ,2, converge
to zero, we have from [18, Lemma 14.1] that [xT(t),ψ T
1 (t),ψ T
2 (t)] converges to zero. Therefore,
[xT(0),ψ T
1 (0),ψ T
2 (0)] has to belong to the stable subspace of M. However, as we argued above, for
every x0 there is exactly one vector ψ1(0) and vector ψ2(0) such that [xT(0),ψ T
1 (0),ψ T
2 (0)] ∈ Es.
So we conclude that for every x0 there exists exactly one Nash equilibrium.
Notice that in case the conditions 1. and 2. of this theorem are satisﬁed, Theorem 3.3 implies
that the unique equilibrium actions are given by (5).
Finally, it will be clear that with c(.)  = 0 (and satisfying an appropriate growth condition)
one can pursue the same analysis as above. Since this analysis brings on only some additional
technicalities and distracts the attention from the basic reasoning we skipped that analysis here. 
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